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Abstract: A new two-stage demand response is designed for the electricity retailers with energy storage system 
(ESS-ER) in the deregulated power market. The ESS-ER could response to the output of different power sources 
by adjusting the charging-discharging behavior according to the bidding power price. The paper models the two-
stage demand response for electric power retailers and proposed a two-layer coordinated optimal model for the 
purchase and sale of the electric power retailers. In the upper layer model, the conditional value at risk method 
and robust stochastic theory are applied to describe the uncertainty influence of wind power and Photovoltaic 
(PV) power, and the minimum whole cost of power purchasing is taken as the objective. In the lower-layer, the 
power consumption behaviors of different customers are considered to get the maximum revenue of power selling 
by implementing differentiated demand response. Then, to solve the two-layer mathematical model, the lower-
layer model is converted into the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions. The results show that: (1) 
The two-stage demand response could smooth the curves of power purchasing and terminal users’ load, which 
could bring more flexible transaction space. (2) The proposed two-layer transaction model could balance the cost 
and risk of power purchasing, bringing more trading opportunities for wind power and PV, which can also reduce 
the energy consumption cost of the end-users. (3) By introducing the risk cost coefficient, confidence degree and 
robust coefficient, the decision-makers can adjust the power trading behaviors, and establish the optimal power 
trading scheme in line with their expected situation. (4) When higher energy storage capacity is set, the efficiency 
of demand response rises. When the capacity ratio of wind to energy storage is 4:1, the efficiency of demand 
response reaches the best. When larger energy storage capacity is set, the demand response turns to be more 
effective. However, when the capacity ratio of wind and PV to energy storage is 4:1, the effect of demand 
response reaches the best. Overall, the proposed model could provide an effective tool for power retailers in 
China's electric power market.  
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0 Introduction  
To improve the operating efficiency of electricity market and break up the monopoly, a significant 
restructuring process for power industry has been initiated in many countries since the 1990s [1]. In China, two 
power system reforms have been carried out. The first power industry reform was implemented according to 
Power System Reform Plan (No.5 Document), including separating the vertical integration power corporation 
(State Power Corporation, SPC) into two parts: power generation enterprises and power grids enterprises in 2002 
[2]. After the reformation, the operating efficiency of the electricity market and competitiveness among power 
generation companies were enhanced significantly. However, the electricity sales market was still dominated by 
the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) and the China Southern Power Grid (CSG). The second power 
industry reform began with the launch of the Further Deepening the Reform of Electric Power System (No.9 
Document) in 2015 [3]. With further implementation, the distribution market and the retail market were 
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introduced to the existing electricity market. Power retailers become new participants into this market, which will 
bring the competition to the retail side. 
In the deregulated power market, the electric power retailers can purchase electricity through contracts or 
spot transactions from the power generation companies or the power pool market [4]. Then, the purchased power 
will be sold to the terminal users. Additionally, electricity retailers sign contracts with users at a pre-agreed selling 
price, which indicates major part of the power retailers in connecting power suppliers and terminal users. The 
main operating benefits are determined by the price difference between purchase and sale. In addition, the smart 
grid technology has become more mature in recent years. Demand response (DR) is introduced to encourage users 
to optimize their power consumption behaviors through flexible price policies, bringing benefits and improving 
the operation efficiency of the supply side [5]. For power retailers, the power purchase cost can reduce with 
energy storage system involved. As the implementer of DR, power retailers should consider how to maximize the 
benefits by power distribution. Therefore, the optimal strategy of power purchase and sale considering DR 
involved in both purchase and retail side is studied, promoting electricity retailers to participate in the electricity 
market.  
DR can be used to encourage the end-users to respond to the system dispatching by implementing 
differentiated tariff policies to mitigate market and public-grid issues [6]. When power retailers participate in or 
implement DR, the risk of price fluctuation and power supply shortage reduces, and the operating efficiency and 
the reliability of energy supply improves. In recent years, many scholars at home and abroad have carried out 
research on the basic concept, classification and technology of DR.  Huang et al. [7] divided the demand response 
into the price-based demand response (PBDR) and the incentive-based demand response (IBDR). Luo et al. [8] 
integrated the IBDR problem with other distributed energy resources in the form of the virtual power plant. 
Eissa .[9] presented a first-time real-time incentive demand response problem is smart grid used by “i-Energy” 
management system. Athanasios et al.[10] introduced an integrated model that perform the simulation of the day-
ahead electricity market, and estimates the income and price elasticities of electricity demand for estimating the 
retailers’ profitability with demand responsive consumers. Yoon et al. [11] proposes an online-learning-based 
strategy for a distribution system operator-based electricity retailer to determine optimal retail prices, considering 
the optimal operations of data-driven demand response using the explicit an artificial neural network (ANN) 
model. 
For electricity retailers, the purpose of flexible trading in the power market is to achieve the lowest power 
purchase cost and the greatest selling benefits. With the development of the power system reformation, the user-
centered management theory needs to be implemented further, requiring more research on DR and the retailers’ 
decision-making on power purchase and sale behaviors [12]. First of all, in terms of power purchase, due to the 
uncertainty and high economics of clean energy power generation, the declared price and the controllability of 
different power generators should be considered. Ben et al. [13] investigates the impacts of electricity market 
variations for electricity retailers on the Nordic stock market returns using hourly observations of electricity spot 
prices pairwise in aggregate market index and some sector indexes. Furthermore, Tom et al. [14] model consumer 
switching in retail electricity markets in New Zealand to identify important determinants of switching and 
estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for six non-price attributes. Boroumand et al. [15] discussed the potential 
benefits of optimal intra-day electricity hedging for the environment from the perspective of electricity retailers. 
Sayyad et al. [16] proposed a robust optimization approach to handle market price uncertainty in which the upper 
deviation from forecasted value of pool price will be considered for risk analysis for a retailer. .  
Then, in power transaction, the electric power retailers sign agreements with different types of users, and as 
the implementer of DR, they set flexible selling prices to guide users’ load, and realize the optimal power 
distribution to obtain the maximum revenue at the same time. Maharjan et al. [17] aimed at maximizing the selling 
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Guo et al. [18] established a multi-objective unified power purchase model aiming at minimizing the total 
purchase cost and the conditional value at risk considering the load deviations. Algarvio et al. [19] developed a 
risk management and the optimization model for the portfolios of retailers operating in liberalized electricity 
markets using the Markowitz theory. Ottesen et al. [20] proposed a short-term decision models for aggregators 
considering power selling with prosumers reserve surplus power purchasing, in which the aggregator can control 
flexible energy units. Dai et al. [21] studied the real-time pricing scheme in smart grid with multiple retailers and 
multiple residential users using Stackelberg game. 
Finally, in power purchase and sale linkage transaction, considering the increasing ability of users in 
responding to market price and incentive information, current research started from the DR of users, and 
established a double-layer decision-making model with the upper model of maximizing retailers’ benefits and the 
lower of maximizing the utility of power consumption [22]. Current research also considered the alliance 
transaction of both the generation side and the user side, and put forward the optimization decision of alliance 
selection and pricing [23]. Fotouhi et al. [24] provided a risk management strategy for retailers to deal with the 
uncertainties in the day-ahead market and hedge the financial losses. Sekizaki et al. [25] presented an power retail 
market model in which elastic demands of users in a distribution network were traded at flexible selling prices 
offered by power retailers. Kettunen et al. [26] developed a multistage stochastic optimization approach for the 
power contract portfolio management, which accounted for uncertainties of both power prices and loads.  Sayyad 
et al [27] proposed a real-time pricing model for electricity retailer in the smart grid with the presence of hydrogen 
storage systems and plug-in electric vehicles under pool market price. 
In summary of the above literature, the following points are obtained: (1) The existing research mainly 
focused on the basic concept, mathematical model and technology of DR, lacking of trading application cases. 
Power retailers can be seen as participants of DR in the purchase side. Only Athanasios et al. [10] and Yoon et al. 
[11], regarding DR as goods between its providers and buyers, discussed its development mode. (2) Some 
research have considered the impact of the uncertainty of uncontrollable power supply such as electricity price 
volatility and wind or photovoltaic (PV) on power purchasing strategy, and put forward a variety of uncertainty 
decision-making models, but failed to consider that the retailers with energy storage system (ESS-ER) can also 
participate in DR, which can flexibly adjust the charging and discharging behaviors, so as to alleviate the above 
uncertainty risks. (3) Many researchers have studied the DR in the retailing side, and established the optimal 
selling strategy for a certain type of users. However, power retailers can always sign contracts with multiple types 
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of users, divided by power consumption characteristics, such as industrial users, commercial users, agricultural 
users and so on. The electricity retailers can implement differentiated DR strategy based on various power 
consumption characteristics, so as to achieve the optimal power allocation. (4) Due to the lack of research on DR 
strategy in power purchase side and the specialization of the research on DR in power selling side, linkage DR 
transactions of power purchase and sale were absent. Considering the above highlights, the possible contributions 
of this paper could be summarized as following. 
 Firstly, the power retailers with energy storage system (ESS-ER) are chosen as the research object, and a 
two-stage DR strategy is proposes, in which the ESS-ER will be regarded as a DR participant in power purchase 
side and a DR implementer in power sale/retail side. When the ESS-ER is taken as the DR participant, in order to 
meet the power demand, the purchase volume is set to be equal before and after the DR being carried out. 
However, when the ESS-ER is regarded as a DR implementer, the way to participate in DR, the revenue of 
different types of users and the profit space of the retailers are discussed. 
 Secondly, a bi-level coordinated optimization model of power purchase and retail for the ESS-ER is 
proposed considering the two-stage demand response, including the combined power purchase optimization 
model in the upper layer and the optimal electricity allocation model in the lower layer. In the upper layer model, 
the generating uncertainties of wind power and PV are considered, and the influence degree of uncertain variables 
in objective function and constraints are measured by introducing CVaR and robust stochastic optimization theory. 
Meanwhile, assuming that retailers can participate in demand response in power purchase side by employing the 
energy storage system, the power purchase cost and risk cost may reduce. In the lower layer model, the 
complementarity and economy of different types of DR are considered, and an optimization strategy is established 
to maximize the revenue of the retailer and to achieve the optimal power allocation among different user types.  
 Finally, in order to achieve the linkage transaction optimization of electricity retailers, the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) condition is introduced in the lower layer model to transform the bi-level optimization model into a 
single-level comprehensive optimization model. The single-level comprehensive optimization model considers the 
characteristics of bilateral demand response in both purchase and retail sides, and is able to transform the power 
consumption information in the sale side into the purchase side immediately to achieve linkage optimization. By 
solving the model, the maximum power sale revenue and the minimum power purchase cost can be achieved at 
the same time, which is, the maximum net revenue of the power retailers.  
The paper is laid out as follows: Section 1 introduces the operating strategies of the ESS-ER, including the 
development background and operation mode. Then, the two-stage demand response mathematical modeling for 
electricity retailer is completed in Section 3. Section 4 establishes a bi-level coordinated optimization model for 
retailers’ power purchase and retail, including the combined power purchase optimization model in the upper and 
the optimal electricity allocation model in the lower. To solve the proposed bilevel model, the lower model is 
transformed to the KKT conditions of the upper model in Section 4. Then, a case study with the IEEE 30-bus 
system is conducted to verify the validity and applicability of the proposed model in Section 5. Section 6 
highlights the contributions and conclusions of this paper. 
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 1 introduces the operating strategies of the ESS-ER, 
including the development background and operation mode. Then, the retailers with energy storage system are 
chosen as the research object, and the operation mode of the ESS-ER is discussed. Furthermore, when the retailers 
is pre-configured with energy storage system, two-stage demand response exist in the power purchase side and 
power sale side, therefore, the two-stage demand response mathematical modeling for electricity retailer is 
completed in Section 2. Section 3 establishes a bilevel coordinated optimization model for retailers’ power 
purchase and retail, including the combined power purchase optimization model in the upper and the optimal 
electricity allocation model in the lower. To solve the proposed bilevel model, the lower model is transformed to 
the KKT conditions of the upper model in Section 4. Then, a case study with the IEEE 30-bus system is conducted 
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to verify the validity and applicability of the proposed model in Section 5. Section 6 highlights the contributions 
and conclusions of this paper. 
1 Operation strategies for the ESS-ER  
1.1 Development of electricity retailers in China 
The power system in China has experienced three vital stages of “integration”, “generation-grid separation”, 
and “three openings, one independence, and three enhancements” [3]. Before 2002, the State Grid Corporation of 
China was in charge of the electricity system that generation, transmission, distribution and retail were integrated. 
In 2002, the hard time for the corporation, to improve the flexibility and competitiveness of generation market, 
State Council of China proposed that power generation plants should be separated with the grid corporation, in the 
Notice on electric power system reform plan (GF [2002] No.5) [2]. In addition, 5 power generation groups and 2 
grid corporations were started, as mentioned in the notice. In 2005, to intensify the flexibility and competitiveness 
of the market and reduce the cost of energy utilization, distribution and retail businesses would orderly be open to 
social capital in the Opinions on further deepening the reform of electric power system (ZF [2015] No.9), and 
power generation/utilization plans which were not for public welfare or adjustment would also be orderly open 

























Fig. 1 The development of electricity system in China 
With continuously open of power retail business, different types of power retailers form. Until December 
2017, 3044 power retailers have been established in China [23]. According to the business type, power retailers 
are composed of independent retailers, grid-owned retailers, generator-owned retailers, and electricity power 
retailers with energy storage system (ESS-ERs). Different from the first three, ESS-ERs can offer both electricity 
service and ancillary services, such as peak regulation, frequency modulation, and reserve. Since ESS-ERs are 
able to charge and discharge via energy storage system, retailers become more flexible in the market. Therefore, 
this paper focuses on the purchase and sale strategies of the ESS-ERs.  
1.2 Operation mode of the ESS-ER 
Considering that the ESS-ER owns an energy storage system, the operation states (charging or discharging) 
can be adjusted according to the bidding power price of different types of power generation plants to cooperate 
with clean energy generation output. In addition, as an implementer of demand response (DR) in the retail side, 
the ESS-ER can encourage end users to adjust their power consumption behaviors. Therefore, ESS-ER can 
implement DR in both purchase and retail side. ESS-ERs do not only participate in PBDR for power purchase, 
but both PBDR and IBDR for power retail. Fig. 2 shows the operation mode of the ESS-ER. 
According to Fig. 2, the operation mode of the ESS-ER includes power purchase and power retail, which 
makes the DR operating in two stages. The details are as follows. 
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 In power purchasing, the ESS-ER will use energy storage to charge and discharge to participate in PBDR, 
based on the bidding prices and purchase demand of different types of power generation plants. When the price is 
relatively low, the ESS-ER will increase its purchase quantity, otherwise, it will decrease to obtain DR revenue, 
thus realizing the objective of minimizing the power purchase cost.  
 In power retailing,  as an implementer of DR, the ESS-ER will sign agreements with different types of 
users to meet the load demands. Retailers participate in PBDR and IBDR by setting reasonable time-of-use (TOU) 
price and controllable load price for power allocation. In addition, extra power selling profits will be obtained by 
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Fig. 2 The operation mode of the ESS-ER 
2 Two-Stage Demand Response of the ESS-ER 
2.1 DR strategy for power purchase 
Without energy storage system, electric power retailers make power purchase plans only according to users’ 
demands. If ESS is introduced, power retailers are able to participate in PBDR for power purchase. For example, 
according to the real-time electricity price of different types of power generators, the purchase demands can be 
adjusted by ESS to realize the minimum power purchase cost. The DR in power purchase only transfers the power 
demand among different periods, not reducing it. Fig. 3 shows the DR strategy for power purchase of the ESS-ER. 
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Fig. 3 The DR strategy for power purchase of the ESS-ER 
According to Fig. 3, the ESS-ER will adjust its own electricity demand based on the real-time price if the 
TOU price is implemented. The calculation is as follows.  
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The calculation of load demand after the PBDR  
ES,tL refers to [28].  ES,tV L  is set to be the electric value 
of 
ES,tL
, then the unit net profit 
P  of the retailer is given by  
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In Eq. (3), the first and second derivatives of ES,tP  are calculated, and  ES,tV L  is Taylor expanded. 
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According to Eqs. (1) and (2), referring to the calculation method of demand variation after PBDR in [28] the 
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The power purchase demand of the ESS-ER at different times after the PBDR can be obtained by using Eq. 
(5). Part of the power purchase demand in peak periods can be transferred to valley periods when the retailer has 
energy storage system and it participates in PBDR.  
2.2 DR strategy for power retail 
Power users include industrial users (IU), commercial users (CU), agricultural users (AU) and residential 
users (RU). Different kinds of users may have different DR means. Referring to [28], DR in retail side contains 
IBDR and PBDR. IBDR means that an ESS-ER signs agreement with users where load reduction, compensation 
and penalty (if the user breaks the agreement) are clearly determined, thus directly managing the users’ power 
consumption behaviors. In this paper, it is assumed that the IBDR makes electricity quantity increase/reduce and 
the users get correspondingly paid, on the premise of the constraints of the users having been satisfied. Fig. 4 













Fig. 4 The IBDR bidding prices in retail side of the ESS-ER 
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Where z IBDR  means that user z participates in IBDR. In this paper, four kinds of users participate in DR. 
Based on their power consumption behaviors, which DR they get involved in is determined as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Different kinds of users and their DR means 
 PBDR IBDR Characteristics 
Industrial users  
(IU)  
Involved;  
Load can be transferred, 
increased and decreased 
Involved;  
Load can be increased 
and decreased 
Huge demand, flexible, proactive, and 
controllable; 




Load can be decreased 
Involved;  
Load can be increased 
and decreased 
Fixed electricity consumption time, 
proactive, and controllable; 




Load can be transferred 
Not involved 
Inelastic demand, flexible, but 
uncontrollable; 





Load can be decreased 
Inelastic demand, controllable, but hard to 
respond actively 
Fixed electricity consumption time, but 
demand can be decreased 
3 Bi-level coordinated optimization model of the ESS-ER 
Considering day-ahead operation results as decision making reference, this paper pays attention to the 
problem of purchase and retail coordinated optimization for the ESS-ER, i.e. how the ESS-ER costs the least and 
gains the most, thus operating in the globally optimal state.  
3.1 Idea of the two-stage model 
The two-stage optimization model for the purchase and retail of the ESS-ER is constructed based on the 
operation mode of the ESS-ER. The power retailing allocation optimization model in the lower layer can be 
transformed into the KKT conditions of the upper purchase portfolio optimization model, thus jointly optimizing 
the power purchase and retail of the ESS-ER and establishing the optimal trading strategy. Fig. 5 shows the 
diagram of the two-stage model construction.  
The upper purchase portfolio 
optimization model
Objective：the minimum power purchase cost
Parameters: bidding electricity and price of 
each unit, load demand, operation parameters of 
each unit ,  PBDR parameters , and robust  
coefficient
Constraints: load supply-demand balance, 
p o we r  s u p p ly  c o ns t ra i n t ,  r obust random 
constraint, DR capacity, and reserve capacity
The lower retailing electricity 
allocation optimization model
Objective: the maximum power retail revenue
Parameters: usersload demands, PBDR and 
IBDR parameters, and retailing price
Constraints：Power supply share constraint , 
DR output constraint, DR revenue constraint, 
and the maximum DR output constraint
The optimal trading strategy
KKT conditions




Fig. 5 The two-stage optimization model construction 
According to Fig. 5, the two-stage coordinated optimization model for power purchase and retail of the ESS-
ER are constructed as follows.  
 In the upper layer model, the minimum power purchase cost is selected as the optimization objective, 
with the constraints including power supply constraints of each kind of power generators, load supply-demand 
balance, reserve capacity and so on. Finally, the purchase portfolio optimization model of the ESS-ER is built. 
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 In the lower layer model, the maximum power retail revenue is taken as optimization objective, with the 
constraints including users’ DR output, power supply share, DR revenue and so on. Finally, the optimal power 
retailing  allocation model of the ESS-ER is built.  
 The objective and constraints of the lower model are transformed into Lagrangian function, and then the 
derivatives of the parameters of the Lagrange function are calculated, i.e. the lower model is transformed into the 
KKT conditions of the upper layer model. Thus, the two-stage model is changed into one-stage. Finally, the 
optimal power purchase and retail strategy is established.  
3.2 Power purchase portfolio optimization model 
In the day-ahead power market, all kinds of power generators bid based on their generation cost and 
reasonable revenue, and get their trading shares. Due to low marginal power generation cost, clean energy power 
generators have the price advantage to get better preferential access to share trading. However, since clean energy 
has strong uncertainty in power generating, retailers may face more risks of power shortage penalty and cost more 
for temporary power purchase, causing actual power generation from clean energy less than that in contract. In 
this paper, the CVaR method is introduced to measure the risk cost caused by clean energy power generators [29]. 
Therefore, the power purchase cost of the ESS-ER includes electricity cost, compensation for contracts breach 
from clean energy power generators, temporary power purchase cost, and power shortage risk cost. The objective 
is expressed as follows.  
    
T K
- UG -
, , , , ,
1 1
min 1 + -ER k t k t k t t k t k t
t k
C g P g P P CVaR 
 
   
                             （7） 
There is no risk cost if ESS-ERs purchase power from controllable power generation sources such as thermal 
power and gas turbines. However, the ESS-ER has to take uncertainty risk when purchasing power from 
uncontrollable sources, which is calculated as follows.  

















G g g g                                     （8） 
Wherein,   is the critical value of power purchase risk cost, which is introduced for determining the risk status of 
power purchase transaction, and  ,f G g  equal to  - UG -, ,-k t t k tg P P , used for calculating power purchase risk cost. 
 1 2 3, , , ,
T
TG g g g g  stands for the decision vector and , , ,, ,
T
WPP t PV t other t   g g g g
 stands for the electricity 
quantity vector purchased from uncontrollable generation sources, which is multivariate random vector. The 
distribution function of the multivariate random vector in Eq. (8) is difficult to determine. Usually, N samples 





















  G g                                         （9） 
Based on Eqs. (7)-(9), the set of power purchase objective is determined by reasonably setting risk aversion 
coefficient  . In addition, power purchase trading also needs to consider constraints. 
(1)Power  purchase balance constraint 
     
U C
- 0
, , , , , ex , ,
1 1
1 1 + 1+u t u t c t c t k t ES t ES t
u c
g g g L L  
 
                                    （10） 
Where 
ex is the reserve purchase power coefficient of the ESS-ER for the electricity consumption growth. The 
electricity consumption growth rate of China is about 4.9%,6.6% and 8.5% in 2016, 2017 and 2018, respectively 
[30]. If not considering the 
ex , when the electricity consumption increase, the power shortage may happen, and 
the power shortage cost could be calculated as shown in Eq.(7). On the contrary, when the 
ex  is set too higher, 
the surplus purchase power cost should be understood by the electivity retailers. How to choose 
ex  should be 
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researched by the sensitivity analysis. Strong uncertainty of ,u tg  will bring risks to power purchase decision 
making plans of the ESS-ER.   
Therefore, the robust coefficient transformation constraint, i.e. Eq. (11), is introduced to provide a risk 
decision making means for different decision makers who have different attitudes towards risk. In other words, the 
random variables are transformed into interval distribution, and the constraints with robust coefficient and 
prediction error coefficient are constructed. Firstly, the variable for net power purchase demand 
tM  is introduced 
as follows. 
   
C
0
, , , ,
1
1t c t c t ES t ES t
c
M g L L

                                            （11） 
Where the prediction error coefficient of uncontrollable generation sources is set to be 









  . To ensure the constraints be satisfied when the uncertain variables reach the boundary, an 
auxiliary variable  , 0u t θ  is introduced and set to be , , , ,u t u t u t u tG e G   , so Eq. (12) can be changed as 
follows. 
 , , , , , , , , ,u t u t u t u t u t u t u t u t u t tg e g g e g g e M                          （12） 
The strongest random constraint can be determined via Eq. (12). However, extreme situations occur at very 
low probability, so a robust coefficient u ,  0,1Γ , is introduced to enhance the flexibility of constraints as 
follows. 
 , , , , , , , , , ,u t u t u t u t u t u t u t u t u t u t tg e g g e g g e M                           （13）
 
(2) Power generation constraint 
The electricity sold by all types of power generators shall not exceed the maximum electricity generation 
capacity. For controllable generation sources, i.e. thermal power and gas turbines, there are ramping constraints 
and startup/shutdown time constraints needed to consider. The constraints are as follows. 
1t t t tv g g g v g
 
                                                           （14） 
on on
1 1( )( ) 0t t tT M v v                                                          （15） 
off off
1 1( )( ) 0t t tT M v v                                                             （16） 
 (3) DR capacity constraint 
To consume more clean energy power generation and decrease the total power purchase cost, the retail will 
adjust its purchase quantity and the portfolio through DR. For electricity retailers, the demand response behaviors 
mainly come from the energy storage, namely, the power retailers could use the ESD to purchase power in the 
load valley period and sell power in the load peak period. However, ESD has two operation modes, namely, the 
longest life cycle (LCC) mode and the optimum economic efficiency (OEE) mode. 
The mainly objective of the OEE mode is to actively participate in energy conversion task and gain the 
maximum power transaction benefit, the detailed operation constraints are as following:  
pur se
, , ,= +ES t ES t ES tL L L                                                            （17） 
min max









                                                                （19） 
The mainly objective of the LCC mode is to optimize the purchase-sale power by adjusting the operation 
strategy of the ESS, the purchase-sale power is infinitely near the rated discharging-charging power, which is 
better to improve the operation life of the systems. The detailed constraints are shown as follows. 
pur dis,R




,ES t ESL g                                                           （21） 
pur sale
, , =0ES t ES tL L                                                             （22） 
 (4) Energy storage operation constraint 
The energy storage system supports the DR operation of the retailer, which requires that power purchase for 







ES t ES t
ES t
ES t ES t
S L in power sale
S




                                            （23） 
max
, 1 ,0 ES t ES t ESS L S                                                          （24） 
pur se




ES ES t ES t ES t
t t
S L S L
 
    ，                                                 （25） 
In, addition, to ensure that users’ load demand can be satisfied, the power purchase should be matched with 







  . 
(5) Reserve capacity 
Since clean energy power generators have strong uncertainty, the retailer will reserve some capacity to 
increase its power supply margin, thus avoiding high cost for power shortage. The constraint is expressed as 
follows. 
max
, , ,t t ES t u t u tg g L r g                                                            (26) 
3.3 Electricity allocation optimization model 
After making the optimal power purchase schedule, the ESS-ER will allocate the purchased power into four 
types of users based on their load demands, which is an investment portfolio issue. Therefore, it is critical to seek 
a path to implementing DR and achieving electricity allocation in different users optimally, thus gaining the 
maximum sale revenue.  





zt zt ES t zt ut zt ES t
t z
R P X L C P X L
 
                                   （27） 
According to Table 1, IU, CU, AU and RU have different DR strategies, so the costs are also different, which 
are calculated as follows.  
   0 0 IBDR IBDR, , , , , ,




it it it it it it it i t i t im t im t im t im t
t i IBDR i m
C C C P L P L P L P L P L   
   
   
         
   
           （28） 
   IBDR IBDR, , , , , , , ,




bt bt bt b t b t bm t bm t bm t bdm t bt bm t bm t
t b IBDR b m
C C C P L P L E L P L L     
   
   
            
   
     （29） 





at at at at at at
t
C C P L P L

                                                   （30） 
 IBDR , , ,




rt rt rt rt rm t rm t rt rm t
t r IBDR r m
C C C L P L P L  
   
   
       
   
                                  （31） 
Where  , , ,z i b a r . In China, the segmented electricity price is implemented for  the residential users (RU), 
which is shown as follows. 
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                                 （32） 
Where d is the interval of the segmented power. 1
rtP  is the electricity price of the residential users in the first 
segmented interval. n is number of the segmented interval. 
(1) Power supply share constraints 
The sum of power supply shares for all kinds of users is 1. Each share is set to be positive, and the power 








                                                        （33） 
   0 IBDR, , , ,
1 1
Z Z
zt zt zt zt z t zm t zm t ES t
z z
L v L o L L L L 
 
                                    （34） 
 (2) Users’ DR constraints 
min 0 max
zt zt zt ztL L L L                                                      （35） 
IBDR,min IBDR IBDR IBDR,max
, , , 1 ,z t z t z t z tL L L L                                             （36） 
,max
, , 1 ,0 zm t zm t zm tL L L
  
                                                     （37） 
,max
, , 1 ,0 zm t zm t zm tL L L
  
                                                     （38） 
In addition, there are startup/shutdown preparation time and maximum output constraints of users 
participating in DR, which are similar to Eqs. (15)-(23).  
(3) DR revenue constraint 
The intention for users to participate in DR is to reduce energy consumption cost, which requires that the cost 
needs to be lower after implementing DR. The constraint is shown as follows.  
 IBDR IBDR 0 0z, z, , , , ,
1 , 1 1
-
i mN NT
zt zt zt zt t t zm t zm t zm t zm t zt zt
t i IBDR i m
v P L o P L P L P L P L   
   
   
       
   
                  （39） 
(4) Users’ maximum DR output constraints 
In order to avoid the excessive DR participation of users, which may result in the output higher of DR 
beyond the peak regulation limitation of ESS, it is necessary to restrict the upper limit of DR output of all kinds of 
users, which are shown as follows.  
min max









                                                            （41） 




ES t zt t zm t zm t ES t ES t
z
L L L L L L S 

                          （42） 
Wherein, max
,ES tL  and 
min
,ES tL  are the upper and lower DR limits of the ESS-ER in power purchasing (which are also 
the maximum charging and discharging power of the energy storage system). Eqs. (41) and (42) are used to limit 
the total DR output produced by all kinds of users within the energy storage ability (capacity and 
charging/discharging power) of the ESS-ER.  
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4 KKT condition of the bi-level optimization model  
The bi-level optimization model in this paper is proposed to study the economics of power purchase and sale 
transaction of the ESS-ER. Due to the difficulty brought by the coupling relationship among the upper, the lower, 
and the non-linear constraints, the bi-level model is transformed into single-level model. Based on section 3, the 
lower model involves a linear programming problem, so a Lagrangian function in the lower model is constructed, 
and then transformed to an added constraint of the upper layer model based on KKT conditions [31]. The 
Lagrangian function is proposed as follows. 
     
      
0 IBDR
, 1 2 , , , ,
1 1 1 1 1 1
0 min 0 max IBDR IBDR IBDR,min
1 1 2 , , 1 , 2
1
T Z T Z Z Z
DR
zt zt zt ES t zt zt zt zt zt z t zm t zm t ES t
t z t z z z
zt zt zt zt zt zt z t z t z t
L C P X L X L v L o L L L L
L L L L L L L L L L
 
   
 
     

   
                
   
               
   
  
         
IBDR IBDR IBDR,max
, 1 , 1 ,
,max ,max
3 , , 1 , 1 , , 1 2 , , 1 4 , , 1 ,
0 0 IBDR IBDR
3 z, z, , ,-
z t z t z t
zm t zm t zm t zm t zm t zm t zm t zm t zm t zm t
zt zt zt zt zt zt t t zm t zm t z
L L
L L L L L L L L L L
P L v P L o P L P L P
   

 
         
   
 
   
                     
          
 
min max
, , 4 5
1 , 1 1
min max IBDR min




m t zm t zt zt zt zt
t i IBDR i m
Z Z Z
zt ES t ES t zt zt t zm t zm t ES t
z z z
L L L L L






   
 
  
   
            
   
     
                      




   max IBDR IBDR, z, , , 4 , z, , , ,
1 1
Z Z
ES t zt t zm t zm t ES t zt t zm t zm t ES t
z z
L L L L S L L L L S   
 
   
                    
   
 
（43） 
Where  ,  ,   and   are the Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to constraints of the lower model. Further, 














   
 








                                                                   （45） 




zt zt zt zt z t zm t zm t ES t
z z
L v L o L L L L  
 
 
            
 
                      （46） 
 0 min10 0zt zt ztL L L                                                    （47） 
  0 max10 0zt zt ztL L L                                              （48） 
 IBDR IBDR IBDR,min2 , , 1 ,0 0z t z t z tL L L                                     （49） 
  IBDR IBDR IBDR,max2 , 1 , 1 ,0 0z t z t z tL L L                                     （50） 
  ,max3 , , 1 ,0 0zm t zm t zm tL L L                                         （51） 
 1 , , 10 0zm t zm tL L                                                    （52） 
 2 , , 10 0zm t zm tL L                                                    （53） 
  ,max4 , , 1 ,0 0zm t zm t zm tL L L                                         （54） 
 0 0 IBDR IBDR3 z, z, , , , ,
1 , 1 1
0 - 0
i mN NT
zt zt zt zt zt zt t t zm t zm t zm t zm t
t i IBDR i m
P L v P L o P L P L P L    
   
    
           
    
   （55） 
 min40 0zt ztL L                                                      （56） 
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      
 
                                          （59） 




zt t zm t zm t ES t
z
L L L L L  

 
            
 
                  （60） 




ES t zt t zm t zm t
z
L L L L L  

 
            
 
                       （61） 




ES t zt t zm t zm t ES t
z
S L L L L S  

 
            
 
                   （62） 
Here, 0 ba   0 equals a  0，b  0， 0ab . Eqs. (46) to (62) are the mixed nonlinear complementarity 
problem in the lower layer model. After the KKT conditions being obtained, the power purchase and retailer trade 
optimization model for the ESS-ER is constructed based on Eqs. (7) to (24), and the optimal power purchase and 
retail strategy will be determined.  
5 Case study 
5.1 Basic data 
The IEEE 30 node system is selected as the simulation system. 2×2MW WPP and 6×0.5MW PV are 
configured at node 2. 1×3MW WPP and 2×1MW PV are configured at node 5. 3×1MW CGT are configured at 
node 8. Therein, the CGT units are CENTAUR40, the up/down ramping power is 0.2 MW/h, and the 
startup/shutdown time is 0.15h. The CGT operation cost function is a quadratic function, and is linearized into a 
two-stage function with the slopes of 150 ¥/MW and 420 ¥/MW to facilitate the calculation [28]. Meanwhile, the 
ESS-ER with a 2MW·h energy storage system is connected to node 6, with the maximum charge/discharge power 
of 0.5MW and the charge/discharge loss of 0.4%. The initial operation model of the energy storage system is the 
OEE mode. Four types of users are IU, CU, AU and RU, with the accumulated maximum and minimum loads of 
10.29 MW and 2.35 MW, respectively. Fig. 6 shows the load demand of different types of users. 
 
Fig. 6 Load demand of different types of users 
As WPP and PV are greatly affected by external natural conditions, it is necessary to simulate the available 
output of WPP and PV. According to the output functions of WPP and PV detailed in Reference [32], cut-in wind 
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scale parameters are set to be 2 and 2v  , respectively. The average wind speed is v . The photovoltaic 
radiation intensity parameters are 0.45 and 9.42, and WPP rated output and PV rated output are both 4MW. Then, 
the scenario simulation of WPP and PV is performed by the simulation and reduction methods proposed in 
Reference [28], obtaining ten sets of typical output scenarios. The scenario that has the maximum probability of 
occurrence is selected as the input scenario. Fig. 7 show the available output of WPP and PV. 
 
Fig. 7 Available output of WPP and PV 
Energy storage has the flexible regulation performance, so the ESS-ER has strong regulation ability as a DR 
participant, which is similar to the IU. Here, the power demand elasticity of IU is selected as that of the ESS-ER 
during power purchasing, referring to [28]. Considering that the DR in power purchase side is mainly generated 
by energy storage, it is set that the TOU price is only carried out for the charge and discharge, and the rest power 
is settled according to the actual electricity transaction. When retailers implement DR, it is necessary to divide a 
day into peak, flat and valley periods for different types of users, and power demand elasticity coefficients are set 
based on Reference [32]. To avoid the phenomenon of “peak-valley upside down” caused by demand over-
response, the load fluctuation generated by IBDR and PBDR shall be within ± 0.5MW, and the positive and 
negative peak regulation output provided by IBDR shall be within 0.5MW. Table 2 shows the DR parameters. 
Table 2 DR parameters 
 Time division PBDR price/(¥/MW·h) IBDR price/(¥/MW·h) 
ESS-ER 
 (energy storage only) 


























6:00-8:00 9:00-19:00 400 500 600 550 650 
RU - - - 350 350 350 - 540 
The grid-connected prices of GT, WPP and PV are set to be 520¥/MW·h, 400¥/MW·h and 450¥/MW·h. 
Before implementing DR, the power prices of IU, CU, AU and RU are 380¥/MW·h, 1200¥/MW·h, 850¥/MW·h 
and 450¥/MW·h. Then, in order to analyze the influence of the price of segmented electricity on the power sales 
income, four equivalent segmented intervals are set. The power purchase cost and the initial risk weight 
coefficients are both set to be 0.5, the confidence level is set to be 0.9, the robust coefficient and prediction 
accuracy of WPP/PV are set to be 0.9. The compensation price for the retailer is set to be 1.2 times of the grid 
connected price when clean energy output is lower than the declared electricity, and the temporary power purchase 
price is set to be 900¥/MW·h. The surplus electricity of the retailer is used for utility peak regulation, which is 
paid at 2000¥/MW·h. The initial reserver purchase power coefficient 



























In order to analyze the effects of DR on the ESS-ER, the effects of DR in power purchase side and in power 
retail side on power purchase and retail strategy are compared and analyzed, and four scenarios are set as follows.  
  Scenario 1 (basic scenario) where DR is not taken into consideration. In this scenario, retailers does not 
implement ESS, so they do not participate in DR in both sides, and the optimal strategy is established under this 
situation.  
 Scenario 2 where DR in power purchase side (PDR) is taken into consideration. In this scenario, retailers 
implement ESS, so it can participate in the PDR to cooperate with clean energy output, and the effects of DR on 
the optimal strategy are analyzed under this situation.  
 Scenario 3 where DR in power retail side (RDR) is taken into consideration. In this scenario, retailers 
does not implement ESS, but the SDR is introduced to encourage users adjust their consumption behaviors, and 
the effects of DR on the optimal strategy are analyzed under this situation.  
 Scenario 4 where DR in both power purchase side and retail side (PRDR) is taken into consideration. In 
this scenario, the coordinated effects of the PRDR on the optimal purchase and retail strategy are analyzed by 
comparing it with Scenarios 1 to 3.  
The model is solved by the GAMS software using CPLEX 11.0 linear solver from ILOG_solver. The CPU 
time required for solving the problem for different case studies with an idea pad450 series laptop computer 
powered by core T6500 processor and 4 GB of RAM. When the optimization is MILP, the GAMs software could 
get a satisfactory solution quickly.  
5.2 Transaction results 
5.2.1 Scenario 1 where DR is not taken into consideration 
In this subsection, the optimal power purchase strategy is established without DR. Because the grid-
connected price consists of marginal cost and reasonable revenue of WPP and PV, the WPP and PV will get 
preferential access to power trade shares, and the rest demand is satisfied by CGT, which makes the minimum 
power purchase cost realized. Fig. 8 is the purchase strategy for retailers without DR.  
 
Fig. 8 Purchase strategy of the retailer without involving DR 
According to Fig. 8, the WPP, PV and CGT supplied power to retailers to satisfy the power demand. Due to 
low output of PV at night, CGT obtained more electricity trade shares. During the day time, PV and WPP offered 
price lower than CGT during high power output period, so the retailer purchase power from PV and WPP 
preferentially. However, considering the uncertainties of wind power and PV generation, retailers had to take 
power shortage risk. Table 3 is the purchase strategies before and after considering the uncertainty.  
Table 3 Purchase strategies before and after considering the uncertainty 































CGT WPP PV CGT WPP PV Cost CVaR Comprehensive cost 
Regular 13.7 91.97 29.23 7124 36788 13154  57066 67936  67935.71 
CVaR and robust 26.2 82.41 26.28 13624 32964 11826 58414 62143  62142.55 
According to Table 3, if the uncertainty is not considered, retailers only aimed at the minimum power 
purchase cost. Meanwhile, more electricity is sold when considering uncertainty. However, it led to higher CVaR 
value, and higher comprehensive power purchase cost as well, which indicates that the proposed power purchase 
portfolio optimization model with CVaR and Robust theory reflected economic benefits and risk cost of WPP and 
PV, and has a better effect on establishing the purchase strategy with respect to cost and risk. 
5.2.2 Scenario 2 where the PDR is taken into consideration 
In this scenario, retailers adjusts its own power consumption by introducing the ESS, i.e. partial load demand 
in peak periods can be transferred to valley periods through PBDR, which smooths the distribution curve of the 
power purchase demand via "peak shaving and valley filling", and spares more room for clean power grid 
connection. Fig. 9 shows the distribution curve of power purchase demand of the ESS-ER before and after DR. 
 
Fig. 9 Power purchase demand of the ESS-ER before and after DR 
According to Fig. 9, after DR, the maximum load demand decreased by 0.43MW, the minimum load demand 
increased by 0.32 MW, and the peak-valley ratio decreased from 3.52 to 2.96. A smoother load demand curve 
makes the retailer purchase more electricity from WPP and PV. Table 4 shows the power purchase strategies of the 
retailers before and after DR.  
Table 4 Power purchase strategies of the retailer before and after DR 
 
Output/MW·h PBDR/MW·h Power purchase demand Objective results/¥ 
CGT WPP PV Positive Negative Peak /MW Valley /MW Peak-valley ratio Cost CVaR Toeal cost 
Before DR 26.20 82.41 26.28 - - 8.63  2.45  3.52  58414 62143  62143 
After DR 24.98 87.18 29.33 6 -6 8.20  2.77  2.96  57421 59814  59814 
According to Table 4, the retailers output ±6MW·h via DR, which made the demand curve smoother and 
spared more room for power generation of WPP and PV. The WPP and PV output increased by 4.77MW·h and 
3.05MW·h respectively, while the CGT output decreased by 1.22MW·h. After the DR, because the output of WPP 
and PV increased, the power purchase cost decreased by 993¥, yet the CVaR decreased by 2329¥. Finally, the 
comprehensive cost decreased by 3326¥, which indicated that apart from decreasing power purchase cost, 
involving DR can also reduce the uncertainty risk cost from WPP and PV, thus realizing the minimum 





























Fig. 10 Power purchase strategy with the DR involved 
According to Fig. 10, after the DR was involved, power purchase in peak periods decreased while power 
purchase in valley periods increased, which made the load demand curve smoother. The retailer provided negative 
output in valley periods, i.e. employing energy storage system to charge, while positive output in peak periods, i.e. 
discharging, which established the optimal power purchase strategy.  
5.2.3 Scenario 3 where the RDR is taken into consideration 
In this scenario, retailers who are considered as DR implementers, set TOU price and controllable load price 
to encourage users to participate in DR and adjust their power demands. According to Tables 1 and 2, the load 
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Fig. 11 load demands of users before and after the PBDR 
According to Fig. 11, the load demand of IU is flexible and can be transferred or increased/decreased, so the 
maximum load demand decreases by 0.27MW, the maximum load demand in valley periods increases by 
0.06MW, and the peak-valley ratio decreases from 4.73 to 3.87. The load demand of CU is barely able to be 
transferred, so some load demand in peak periods reduces. The maximum load demand of CU decreases from 
2.79MW to 2.51MW, and its peak-valley ratio decreases from 2.98 to 2.69. The load demand of AU can be 
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demand of RU is inevitable and difficult to be transferred, so it remains unchanged after PBDR. Fig. 12 shows the 
IBDR strategies for different types of users.  
 
Fig. 12 IBDR strategies of different types of users 
According to Fig. 12, considering that the agricultural power consumption is an inevitable part in production, 
it cannot be reduced but can be transferred. Thus, this AU cannot participate in IBDR. The industrial power 
consumption was flexible, which can increase at night (valley periods) for positive regulation and decrease in 
daytime (peak periods) for negative regulation. CU mostly work in daytime, so they can participate in IBDR by 
reducing temporary power consumption. Table 5 shows the optimal power retail strategy of the ESS-ER after DR.  
Table 5 The optimal power retail strategy of the ESS-ER after DR 
  
Power consumption cost/¥ DR revenue/¥ Revenue of the ESS-ER/¥ 













28520  50549  12813  11235  - - - - - 58414  103117  - 44703  
After 
DR 
24349  48821  11966  11235  5731  3439  847  243  3513  57421  96371  12711  48148  
According to Table 5, the power consumption costs of IU, CU and AU all decreases after the PBDR. Among 
them, AU gain the least DR revenue among the three types of users. For the ESS-ER, though the cost of IBDR 
increases, the power saved from PBDR and IBDR can be sold to the utility grid, thus gaining peak regulation 
revenue, so the net revenue of the ESS-ER increases by 3445¥. Therefore, for the ESS-ERs, implementing DR can 
not only reduce users’ costs, but also bring more revenue, thus achieving the win-win between the retailers and 
users.  
5.2.4 Scenario 4 where the PRDR is taken into consideration 
In this scenario, the optimal power purchase and retail strategy for ESS-ERs considering PRDR is discussed. 
Different from Scenarios 2 and 3, DR in purchase side and DR in retail side are connected, and the lower retail 
model is transformed to the KKT conditions of the upper purchase model by using Eqs. (37) to (55), achieving 
coordinated optimization of power purchase and retail. Fig. 13 shows the optimal power purchase and retail 
strategy of the ESS-ER with the PSDR involved.  
According to Fig. 13, the load demand in valley periods significantly increases and that in peak periods 
decreases via energy storage and DR, making the power purchase demand curve much smoother, which shows a 
better effect of “peak shaving and valley filling” than other scenarios. Correspondingly, the generation of WPP 
and PV increase and that of CGT reduces than Scenario 2, which indicated a cleaner and more low-carbon 




































Fig.13 The optimal power purchase and retail strategy of the ESS-ER with the PSDR involved  
Compared with Scenario 1, Scenarios 2 considers the impact of the PDR and Scenario 4 considers the impact 
of the PRDR. According to Table 6, after DR, power retailers purchase more power from WPP and PV due to the 
participating of ESS, which allowed the retailers to purchase more power with lower price in the valley periods 
for storage and sell it in peak periods. Although there were IBDR dispatch costs in Scenarios 3 and 4, peak 
regulation revenue was gained from trading with the utility grid. Finally, the net revenue of Scenario 3 or 4 is 
higher than that of Scenario 1 or 2, and Scenario 4 was the highest. Therefore, the retailers can use energy storage 
to participate in the PRDR, thus achieving the maximum net revenue.  
Table 6 The optimal strategies in different scenarios 
 
Power purchase/MW·h Power retail/MW·h Objective function results/¥ 













26.2 82.41 26.28 - 38.03 42.12 21.36 32.1 58414  - 103117  - 44703  
Scenario 
2 
24.98 87.18 29.33 ±6 36.66 40.09 21.36 32.1 57421  - 103117  - 45696  
Scenario 
3 
26.2 82.41 26.28 - 36.41 38.94 21.36 31.65 58414  3513  96371  12711  48148  
Scenario 
4 
20.85 85.82 31.21 ±6 35.7 38.54 21.36 30.85 54552  5478  95824  14311  50105  
5.3 Results analysis 
Power generation of WPP and PV has a contradiction between lower cost and higher risk of power shortage, 
so the way to balance the cost of power purchase and the risk is the key issue in power purchase and retail for the 
ESS-ERs. The CVaR method and robust stochastic optimization theory are used to represent the uncertainty of the 
objective functions and constraints respectively. Different parameter settings also affect the power purchase 
strategy. In addition, the PDR quantity mainly depends on the energy storage capacity. The reasonable energy 
storage capacity is also important for optimal operation of the retailers. Therefore, the sensitivity analyses of risk 
cost coefficient, confidence level, robust coefficient and energy storage capacity are conducted. 
(1) Impact of risk cost coefficient 
The setting of the risk cost coefficient reflects the risk attitude of the retailer directly. When the risk cost 
coefficient is high, the retailers are sensitive to the uncertainty of wind/PV power generation and unwilling to bear 
the risk caused by the actual output of wind/photovoltaic power generating less than expected. When the risk cost 
coefficient is low, the retailers prefer low-priced wind/photovoltaic power generation to gain excess returns in the 































Fig. 14 Total cost of the retailer under different risk cost coefficients 
According to Fig. 14, with the increase of risk cost coefficient, the power retailers gradually increase the 
power share of CGT, and the power purchase cost also gradually increases. Due to the high cost coefficient, the 
retailers faced higher risk cost, thus resulting in the increase of the total cost. With respect to total cost curve, 
when the risk cost coefficient is higher than 0.75, the curve started to go higher more slowly, which indicated that 
the purchase strategy was getting closer to the most conservative state. In general, the retailers can choose a 
reasonable risk cost coefficient between 0.25 and 0.75 based on their risk attitude. 
(2) Impacts of confidence level and robust coefficient 
Due to the strong uncertainty of wind power and PV generation, when different confidence levels and robust 
coefficients are set, the power purchase strategy of the retailer will change greatly, which is similar to the risk cost 
coefficient. When the values of confidence level and robust coefficient are high, the retailers are more sensitive 
and refuse to bear the power purchase risk. On the contrary, when the values are low, the retailers are willing to 
take some risks to pursue excess economic returns. Fig. 15 shows the optimal power purchase strategy of the 
retailers under different confidence levels and robust coefficients. 
 
Fig. 15 The optimal power purchase strategy under different confidence levels and robust coefficients 
According to Fig. 15, with respect to power purchase cost, the increase of confidence level and robust 
coefficient will bring higher costs for power purchase. When the confidence level is higher than 0.9, the power 
purchase cost increased sharply, showing that the CVaR method can effectively reflect the risk of power purchase 
strategies. When the robust coefficient increases from 0.8 to 0.9, the power purchase cost increased greatly, while 
when the robust coefficient is higher than 0.9, the power purchase cost increases slightly, indicating that the power 
purchase strategy basically reaches the most conservative state. With respect to the wind/PV power generation, 
when the robust coefficient increases from 0.8 to 0.85, the wind/PV power generation decreases dramatically. 






































































































than 0.95, the wind power generation decreases substantially. At this point, the retailers are in a state of extreme 
risk aversion, where although the increase of confidence level may lead to reduced the wind/photovoltaic power 
generation, the strategy was basically close to the most conservative state, thus the curtailment of 
wind/photovoltaic power is not large. 
(3) Impact of the capacity and mode of energy storage capacity  
The capacity and mode of energy storage especially for electricity is very important and sensitive for the 
obtainable revenue of retailers. According to Eqs. (18)-(19) and Eqs. (20)-(22), the longest life cycle (LCC) mode 
and the optimum economic efficiency (OEE) mode are defined. Table 7 is the power purchase and sale transaction 
results under different operation modes. 
Table 7 Power purchase and sale transaction results under different operation mode 
Mode 
Power purchase/MW·h Power purchase cost/103¥ Power sale benefit/103¥ 
CGT WPP PV DR Cost CVaR IBDR cost Retail revenue Regulation revenue Net benefit 
LCC 30.84  78.95  28.09  ±4.5 57.87 43.38 4.274 95.824 14.311 47.99  
OEE 20.85 85.82 31.21 ±6 54.55  47.53 5.478 95.824 14.311 50.105 
According to Table 7, when the ESS operates in the LCC mode, the purchase and sale power of power 
retailers will be close to the rated discharging-charging power of the ESS, and the total output of the ESS is less 
than that in the OEE mode. Correspondingly, the grid-connected power of WPP and PV is also less than that in 
the OEE mode, namely, 6.87MW·h and 3.12 MW·h, resulting in that the power purchased cost increased by 
6.1% and the CVaR cost decreased by 8.7%. The net benefits of power purchase and sale transaction decreases by 
4.2%, which means the total power purchased from WPP and PV decreases in the LCC mode, and this will 
decrease the power purchase risk and increase the power purchase cost. Meanwhile, the net benefits will also 
decrease. That’s to say, in order to gain more operation life, the power retailers should sacrifice some net benefits. 
For gaining the maximum benefit, the OEE mode is better. Then, because the PDR mainly depends on energy 
storage system. In general, the larger the storage capacity is, the more the PDR will be. Therefore, it is necessary 
to analyze the purchase and retail strategies of the retailer under different kinds of storage capacity, and establish 
the optimal one. Table 8 shows the purchase and sale strategies of the retailer under different kinds of storage 
capacity. 
Table 8 Purchase and sale strategies of the retailer under different kinds of storage capacity 
  
Power purchase/MW·h Objective function results/¥ 
CGT WPP PV DR Power purchase cost IBDR cost Net revenue 
0MW·h 26.2 82.41 26.28 0 58414  3513  48148  
1MW·h 24.12  83.26  27.51  ±2 57124  4079  48932  
2MW·h 22.03  84.12  28.75  ±4 55842  4716  49577  
3MW·h 20.85  85.82 31.21 ±6 54552  5478  50105  
4MW·h 19.43  86.45 32.25 ±7 53408  6315  50411  
5MW·h 18.95  87.14 32.15 ±8 53209  6246  50681  
According to Table 8, when the storage capacity is 0, the retailers are unable to participate in the PDR, and 
cope with the uncertainty risk of wind power and PV generation, so the CGT contributes the most, which reaches 
26.2MW·h. When the storage capacity increasea from 1MW·h to 3MW·h, the retailers’ DR capacity grows 
rapidly, so does the share of wind power and PV generation. When the energy storage capacity exceeds 3 MW·h, 
the growth of DR capacity slows down, as well as the share growth of wind power and PV power purchase. 
Especially, 4:1 is the best purchase ratio of wind/photovoltaic power and energy storage, which can realize the 
best utilization of DR capacity of the retailers and achieve the optimal power purchase. From the perspective of 
the RDR, the retailers have greater adjustment ability and can provide more powerful supports for the RDR after 
employing the ESS. Thus, the IBDR dispatching capacity and cost increase gradually. When the remaining 
capacity is sold to the utility grid, the net revenue of the retailers increase accordingly. 
(4) Impact of power selling price and reserve purchase power coefficients 
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Based on the uncertainty of wind power and PV generation, the uncertainty of the electricity and the price are 
considered in this section. Firstly, the price of segmented electric power for residential users is discussed, and the 
segmented interval setting is key for residential users. Table 9 is the power purchasing and selling benefits under 
different segmented number. 
Table 9 Power retail and sale benefit under different segmented number 
Segmented  
number 
Power retail/MW·h Power purchase and sale transaction benefit/¥ 
IU CU AU RU Cost Revenue Net benefit 
1 35.70  38.54  21.36 30.85  54552 104657 50105 
2 35.70  40.50  21.85 28.40  54552 105704  51152  
3 35.70  41.70  22.15 26.90  54552 106232  51680  
4 35.70  43.20  22.25 25.30  54552 106763  52211  
According to Table 9, if the price of segmented electricity for residential users is considered, the power 
proportio for RU decreases, and the power proportion for CU and AU increase since the power prices of CU and 
AU are higher. When more power is used by CU and AU, the power selling revenue increase and the net benefits 
also increase obviously. Overall, the price of segmented power is important for improving power selling incomes. 
For power retailers, the price of segmented power should be implemented for different types of users, which could 
bring more benefits. Except for the price fluctuation, the power consumption growth rates of China in 2016, 2017 
and 2018 are about 4.9%、6.6% and 8.5%, respectively. The power retailers should also consider the power 
consumption growth rate as described in Eq.(10), Fig.16 is the power transaction results under different reserve 
purchase power coefficients.  
 
Fig.16 Power transaction results under different reserve purchase power coefficients 
According to Fig.16, the reserve purchase power coefficients from 0 to 15% are discussed for the power 
purchase and sale transaction. It can be seen, when the reserve purchase power coefficients belong to [5%, 10%], 
the growth rate of the net benefits is relatively stable, which means the increased power purchase cost is able to 
offset risk costs, that’s to say, to reach the optimal power transaction. However, when the reserve purchase power 
coefficients are bigger than 10%, the power sale revenue will reach the upper limit because the power demand 
reaches the top. When the reserve purchase power coefficients are less than 5%, the increased power purchase 
cost is less than the risk cost caused by renewable energy generation, so the power purchased cost and the net 
benefits of power transaction increase. Overall, reasonable reserve purchase power coefficients should be set 
according to the power consumption growth rate for power retailers to gain the optimal power transaction benefits.  
6 Conclusions 
As China's electric power market reformation developing constantly, more types of power sellers will come 
up in the future, among which, retailers with energy storage system will become a special kind that can realize 
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retailer with energy storage system was selected as the research object, and a two-stage demand response 
framework for power purchase and sale transactions both considering price-based demand response and incentive-
based demand response was built. Correspondingly, a two-stage coordinated optimal model for power purchase 
and sale transactions of electric power retailers was proposed. Moreover, the model was solved by introducing the 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for establishing the optimal power purchase and sale strategy. 
Through case study, this paper concluded as follows. 
(1) The two-stage demand response could smooth the curves of power purchasing and terminal  load, which 
could bring more space for power transaction. On one hand, by adjusting the charging-discharging behaviors to 
response to the power source , the electricity retailers could purchase more power from wind power and PV power 
to decrease the cost of power purchasing. On the other hand, the electricity retailers could implement demand 
response to terminal customers, which will bring the controllable loads for the retailers to gain more revenue from 
the public power grid. Overall, the transaction space for electricity purchase and sale will be widen. 
(2) The proposed two-stage transaction model could balance the cost and risk of power purchasing, and 
increase the transaction share from wind and PV power, thus decreasing power consumption cost of users as well 
as increasing the retailers’ revenue. In the upper layer model, the uncertainty of wind and PV power is considered, 
and the influence degree of uncertainty variables in the objective function and constraint conditions are measured 
through the conditional value at risk method and robust stochastic optimization theory respectively. Meanwhile, 
the retailers participate in demand response in the power purchase side by making use of the energy storage 
system in order to reduce power purchase cost and risk cost. In the lower layer model, considering the 
complementarity and economy of different types of demand response, how to introduce demand response to 
achieve the optimal electricity allocation among different types of users is analyzed, so as to obtain the maximum 
power retail revenue. 
(3) The results of sensitivity analysis show that introducing risk cost coefficient, confidence level and robust 
coefficient is an effective way for decision makers (i.e. retailers) to adjust the purchase and sale of electricity 
flexibly, and higher energy storage capacity, within an appropriate range, can drive a greater demand response 
effect. On the one hand, when the risk cost coefficient is set to be 0.75 or more, the increase of the total cost slows 
down, which indicates that the strategy of power purchase basically reaches the most conservative state. When the 
confidence is between 0.85 and 0.95, and the robust coefficient is between 0.8 and 0.9, both the power purchase 
cost and wind/photovoltaic power volume drop by a large margin, which indicates that the decision-maker balance 
the power purchase cost and power purchase risk according to the actual situation. When the ratio of 
wind/photovoltaic power purchase and energy storage capacity is over 4:1, the same increase of energy storage 
capacity will slow down the increase of demand response capacity of the retailer. When the reserve purchase 
power coefficients belong to [5%, 10%], the growth rate of the net benefits is relatively stable, which means the 
increased power purchase cost is able to offset risk costs, that’s to say, the power transaction result is optimal. 
(4) This paper focuses on the uncertainty of wind power and photovoltaic power generation when analyzing 
the uncertainty of power purchase cost, and proposes a decision-making model based on conditional value at risk 
method and robust stochastic optimization theory. As the current spot market in China is still in the pilot 
construction stage, the price volatility of power purchase and sale is not involved. In the future, with the 
development of the spot market, the price volatility will also become a key factor affecting retailers making 
decisions, which makes it a future research point. Although the price of segmented electricity is implemented for 
the residential users (RU), however, the price fluctuation of the other types of the electricity users should be 
researched further. In addition, the electricity consumption growth rate of China will be also a key issue, how to 
accurately deal with the problems based on the sensitivity analysis should also be studied further. 
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